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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The banking sector has always been a very attractive area for economic
research and studies. It has been pointed out that a country's economic
development and the advances of the financial sector are closely connected and
reinforce each other. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the performance of
banks in order to have a complete understanding of the country's overall state of
the economy.
In this study we explore Russian banking system and its development. The
recent fmancial crisis of August 1998 revealed several fundamental problems of
Russian banking sector as well as of the whole economy. But so far only a
number of descriptive studies evaluation performance of banks during and after
this crisis have been performed. Our analysis focuses on relative evaluation of
performance of banks before and after the crisis. We compare efficiency and
productivity growth differentials in order to understand what categories of banks
were better performers.
As a method of study we adopt Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
approach. DEA models were extensively used for analyzing banking firms. Their
advantage is the ability to incorporate multiple inputs and multiple outputs as well
as various forms of constraints. Though this framework does not require profit-
maximization assumption and does not explicitly account for the market structure,it proved to give meaningful results and to serve its purpose to give the estimation
of'who does better'.
We found that banks performance varies for banks with different asset
size, license status, and regional status.
The paper unfolds as following. Chapter 2 presents the profile of the
Russian banking sector, classification of banks, their performance as well as
overview of August 1998 crisis and its effect on banking sector. Chapter 3 is
devoted to the discussion of theoretical framework, previous studies and empirical
model set up. In Chapter 4 data set and the results of the application are described.
Chapter 5 concludes.3
CHAPTER 2. RUSSIAN BANKING SYSTEM AI)
FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1998
A strong financial system is a must for a well-functioning economy. In this
Chapter we will follow the developmentofthe banking system in Russia, its
structural features and performance. Then, we will turn to the eventsofthe 1998
financial crisis and their interdependence with inherent weaknessesofRussian
banks. A discussionofhow banks fared during the crisis and IMF involvement
concludes.
2.1. Special Features of the Russian Banking System
2.1.1. Dynamics of Growth of Russian Banks
The Russian banking system has undergone under huge changes over the
past fifteen years. Initially, in the centrally planned Soviet economy there was a
one-tier banking system with only a few banks with clearly divided fields of
operation:
-Savings Institutions collected deposits from private individuals and delivered
this moneyintothe state budget;
-Stroibank fmanced construction and industrial projects;
-Vneshtorgbank dealt with international operations, involving transactions in
foreign currency;
-State Bank was in charge of issuing money, extending short-term loans for
industrial enterprises and servicing the agricultural sector.-I
Soon after the reforms started, in July 1987, "the system of specialized banks
was introduced in the Soviet Union with similar division, but two more
institutions were introduced: Agroprombank and Zhilcotsbank. (Salonen, 1996).
In fact, major changes began in December 1990 after adoption of the
USSR laws "On the USSR State Bank" and "On Banks and Banking Activity",
which established two-tier banking system and defined the rules for setting up
commercial banks and regulating them by the Central Bank. Similar laws were
passed in Russia and other republics. Rapid growth and proliferation of finns in
the banking sector up until 1995 and the stagnation of this process after 1995 are
described in Table 2.1. There are many factors to explain such growth and
decline.
First, there was a very scarce supply of payment services for enterprises,
while demand from the growing number of small and medium size businesses was
increasing.
Second, the regulations, "concerning the establishment of new banks were
extremely liberal... - the requirements for minimum capital were low...,other
requirements were simple and applications for bank registration were examined
quickly." (Dmitriev et al., 1998).5
Table 2.1. Number of bank registered by CBR in Russia, 1 990 1999
Indicator 199119921993199419951996199719981999
Number of 136017132019251725982601255224812439
registered banks
% change n.a.26 17.924.73.2 0.1-1.9-2.7-1.7
Number of n.a.n.a.n.a.245722952030169714741401
functioning banks
%change n.a.n.a.n.a.n.a.-6.6-11.5-16.4-13.1-5.1
Number of banks2 7 25 65 22528133422952
with revoked
licenses
%of all n.a.0.5 1.53.28.9 10.812.89.03.5
registered______
Number of loss-n.a.82 199582525404268348415
making banks
%of all n.a.4.89.923.722.919.915.823.629.2
Source. CBR, Expert (September 1999).
Table 2.2. Inflation and average nominal returns on major fmancial assets during
1994, 1995 and Qi of 1996, annual rates
1994 1995 1996(1)
Inflation (CPI) 202.71 130.81 45.55
Ruble/S exchange rate depreciation 184.68 30.70 22.75
Average bank deposit and loan rates:
Ruble loan rate 332.05 308.58 216.32
Rubledepositrate 210.11 125.87 82.39
Spread 121.94 182.71 133.93
Dollar loan rate 31.14 34.45 40.99
Dollar deposit rate 11.09 15.76 17.30
Spread 20.05 18.69 23.69
Average annual yield on government
bonds
196.20 187.32 94.87
Average interbank interest rate (7 days) 207.75 171.98 72.09
Source: Warner (1998).Third, the motivation behind such high growth was also linked to high
profitability (Warner, 1998).'
Why was it possible for the banking sector to grow and be very profitable
when the economy was in downfall? GDP was declining at the average rate of
8.5% annually since 1992( IMF, 1999). Inflation and the absence of direct
interest ratecontrol2made it possible for the banks to harvest the benefits from
the implicit inflationtax.3Banks were able to get large volumes of directed
credits through the Central Bank and earned on placing these credits with profit.
Large volumes of non-interest deposits also contributed positively for the high
profits. (Warner, 1998).
Under conditions of high inflation the best option for banks was to keep
their assets in hard currency to secure their value. Table 2.2. shows that the spread
in operations in rubles in 1995-1996 was even higher than the inflation rate, but
the ruble/$ exchange rate depreciation made it more attractive to use dollar
instruments. It was also justified by the fact that banks were participating in large
scale foreign currency operations, which were relatively profitable as long as the
exchange rate varied drastically. They "fared better foregoing opportunities to
lend money to enterprises, which carried with it the risk that the bank would not
be repaid the money" (Aslund, 1996). Foreign exchange operations was a better
See section 2.2.1. for more on this.
2Banks could set their loan and deposit rates at their discretion.
Banks owed their depositors less in real terms due to the inflation.7
option even considering the riskiness: only the rate difference is at stake, while
the credits are not returned in full, and often together with interest payments.
Ability to maintain the wide spread (Table 2.2) was explained by the fact
that even when the number of banks was large (Table 2.1), financial markets were
still underdeveloped and not competitive. As EBRD (1998) highlights,
inefficiencies, market power and economic instability are the main attributes of
high spreads.
Since 1995, on the contrary, the number of functioning banks started to
decrease. The crisis of interbank credit market in 1995 and the crash of MMIvI
pyramid4were the signals for the Central Bank to pay more attention to the
expansion of the banking sector and regulations. Capital requirements were raised
for newly established banks and corrections for equity value for existing banks
were adopted.
Significantly, reduced margin of foreign exchange operations and
diminution of directed credits lowered profitability of banking sector.
Banking firms that could not keep up with the new standards had their
licenses revoked. For the analysis of the crisis of 1998 in particular, wewill
separate banks into 'good' (those which managed to maintain their licenses in
1998) and 'bad' (with the licenses revoked in 1998). Wewillnot separate bank by
the type of the license, since most of them either had general license, which
allowed to perform all types of the operations, or both ruble and foreign currency
MMM was a fmancial company that collected a lot of citizen's funds and later did not
pay them back.8
licenses, which gave banks the same ability to participate in the operations with
the foreign currency as a generallicense.5
2.1.2. Regional Imbalances
Another feature is regional disproportion of banks' allocation. Most banks
are concentrated in the Moscow region (Figure 2.1.). The capital's dominance is
even more dramatic in terms of assets concentration (Figure 2.2.). Of the 30
biggest banks in terms of assets, 26 are located in Moscow, and the remaining
four are in St. Petersburg.
Moscow banks are also bigger in terms of registered authorized capital.
80.5% of banks from the group with highest assets - above 40 mln R - belong to
Moscow region. Banks in Moscow have also the largest number of branches in
other regions (20.5% of all branches according to CBR, 1999) and abroad.
Besides this, the rapid growth in the number of banks, the Russian banking
sector is highly concentrated. "At end-1997, the top five banks accounted for 36
% of total assets and the top 50 for 71 percent. Private sector deposits were
similarly concentrated: at end- 1997 five banks accounted for 58 % of ruble
deposits and 50 banks for 65%....Most banks remain small in terms of the size of
operations and, with only 1/4 of them authorized to have capital above 20 million
rubles ($1 million) at the end- 1998." (IMP, 1999).
Taking this into account, wewilldistinguish the banks from Moscow and
other regions and investigate whether their performance differed.
Russian banks are universal: there are no purely investment banks or saving banks.
License allows them to do both.§
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2.1.3. Assets and Ownership Structure
Government has a stake in only a few banks. They include:
-Sberbank - big market share of this bank on many markets- deposits and
geographical areas allows government to control those segments;
-Banks, servicing international connections Vnesheconombank,
Vneshtorgbank, Roseximbank.
Foreign participation in Russian banking system is limited to 12 % of total
banking capital in Russia. The number of branches and offices is restricted to
one, according to a decree entitled "On Conditions for Opening Banks with
Foreign Ownership in Russia" (04.03.1993).
Such limitations mean that the opportunity to benefit from the formation
of a more competitive environment and technology spillovers, brought by the
presence of foreign banks, was largely forgone for Russia.
In terms of private domestic owners, many banks founded by enterprises
or groups of enterprises. This is beneficial in terms of tax advantages (intra-group
operations are tax exempt), access to subsidized credits, overall greater financial
flexibility.
Most of the banks owned by these three type of investors, are the biggest
in terms of assets. And interestingly, notallof them are from Moscow region.
Wewilltake a look how banks of different sizes fared, even though the
distinction by the ownership structure is not feasible.11
Qualitative distinctions, provided above, do not reveal the actual situation
in banking business, especially relative to other countries. Analysis of banks
assets and liabilities help to make this point clear.
2.1.4. Structure of Assets and Liabilities
Table 2.3. Structure of balance sheets of Russian and the US commercial
banks
Position US banks* Russian banks
1993 1.995 1994 1997%
change
Assets 100 100 100 100
Non-earning assets 13.4 11 51.8 25.1 -51.6
Cash andcornaccounts 2.4 5.6 35.1 14.9-57.4
Other non-earning assets 11 5.3 16.8 36.9 120.3
Earning assets 86.9 89 48.2 74.9 55.5
Loans 60.7 65.6 41.3 44.6 8.1
Loans to firms 58.1 60.7 30.3 37.3 23.2
Loans to banks 2.6 4.9 11 7.3-33.4
Investment in securities 24.2 23.4 6.9 30.3339.6
Government securities 22.1 16.7 6 24.8319.4
Other securities 2.1 6.8 1 5.5462.2
Liabilities 100 100 100 100
Obligations 90.9 91.8 90.6 83.3. -8.1
Time deposits 49.4 44.7 15.1 25 65.4
Current andcornaccounts 25.5 19.2 45.3 30.3 -33.2
Interbankloans 9.1 16.4 11.5 15.3 33.1
Other liabilities 6.9 11.5 18.6 12.7 -32
Equity capital 9.1 8.2 9.5 16.7 77.3
Source: Matovnikov et al. (1999), Expert (March 1998).
* The US- all insured banks; Russia - sampleof815 banks.12
At the initial stages of their development, Russian banks were
holding significant amounts of non-earning assets, as well as operating
government funds on a large scale.Credits were few, mostly short-term. But as
the time went by, several improvements took place (See Table 2.3.).
The main changes are the following. Cash and corresponding accounts
were reduced by 57.4%, which is an important decrease in idle money. Loans to
the industry were increased, while the interbank loans amounted to only 7.3%. (In
1997, 43% of income of Moscow banks were earned from interest on loans.
Regional banks had 50% of their income from direct lending.)
Banks started to invest on the stock market, which is reflected in the
increase in securities holdings, especially of government origin.
On the liabilities side, deposits were attracted with more success, their
share increased by 65.4%. In addition, equity capital also rose, partly as a result of
profits accumulation.
On the whole, it is evident that Russian banks moved closer to the
standards of the well-established banking systems, as we compare the data on the
US banks and Russian banks. Banks started to behave more rationally, reducing
non-interest earning assets and obtaining most funds through relatively
inexpensive source such as deposits. But there is a much room for improvement in
performance and the next section takes on this issue.13
2.2.Determinants of Performance of Russian Banks
2.2.1.Profitability
Profit is an important measure of success. Table 2.4 shows the
exceptionally high bank profitability Russia witnessed over the early '90s. Aswe
mentioned before, mostly it was due to foreign exchange trading and high
inflation.
Compared to other transition economies, banks profitability weighted by
assets was higher than average in Russia, except for 1995 and 1997 (See Table
2.5, line 1). In 1995 the interbank market crisis occurred, while destabilization in
1997 was mainly caused by contagion from the Asian crisis.
Table 2.4. Profitability of Russian banks in 199 1-1995
Indicator 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Profits, blnR 20 481.55298.71200025000
Losses, bin R n.a 1.6 166.7 2200 5400
ROA 0.88 2.4 4.3 2.7 3
ROE 22.6 39.1 51 34.1 60.5
Source: Expert (October 1996), Matovnikov et al. (1999).
As EBRD (1998) proposes, "net interest margin of banks - the difference
between interest revenues and interest expenses scaled by their total assets- is a
key determinant of profitability." Russia's margin varied significantly over 1993
-1997 (See Table 2.5,line2). The absolute level of difference between interest14
rates on deposits and loans remained high. (See Table 2.2.). This helped banks to
maintain high profits, but" countries with higher margins tend to have made less
progress in transition and in macroeconomic
stabilization.'4(EBRD, 1998).
Table 2.5. Main indicators of Russian banking system performance* (cross-
country average for 16 transition economies in brackets)
[ndicator 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 \verage
1. Average ratio of net income1.9(3.6).5(2.1)1.5(2.1)).2(2.2)1.7(3.1).0(2.6)
efore taxes to total assets
.Average ratio of net interest3.3(7.3).0(6.2).7(6.6)11.3(6.4)1.0(4.5);.7(6.2)
ncome to total assets
3. Average ratio of equity to total11.2(8.4)10.9(8.2).9(9.7)13.8(10.0)12.8(12.2)11.5(9.6)
issets
cale of deposit taking and lending:
I. Ratio of broad money to GDP14(42)11(36)117(33)16(33)17(33)J19(35)
I I
5. Ratio of credit to the private12(26)12(22) (19) 1(21) (23) (22)
ectortoGDPin% _____j_____ _____I____
Source: EBRD(1998).
* Numbers in the lines 1,2,3,are based on a sample information and may
diverge from data from other sources.
2.2.2. Quality of Credit Portfolio
The quality of the credit portfolio can be expressed in terms of overdue
loan shares. As Table 2.6 suggests, overdue loans accounted for an increasing
proportion since 1996. Besides, overdue interest payments were twice as high as
principal balances.
In all transition economies bank lending tends to be short-term and reflects
"the unsettled economic environment in which banks operate, the weak legal and
accounting framework to support long-term, secured lending, and the need to15
develop skills and practices necessary for sound lending decisions." (EBRD,
1998).
Table 2.6. Quality of credit portfolios of Russian banks
Indicator
I 19961 199711998*
%of overdue debt
Credits to enterprises 5.4 7.9 8.3
Interbank credits 6.2 4.1 4.2
%of overdue debt including overdue interest
Credits to enterprises 13.4 16.1 16.8
Interbank credits 8 5.2 5.1
Source. Expert (September 1998).
* Estimated.
Schnitzer (1999) showed that bad loans are more likely the larger the
number of banks competing for the customers. Free entry lowers transaction
costs, but too many banks entering may result in a rise in the bad loan problem.
This may be a convincing explanation for the Russian case, if we take into
account the fact that accounting indicators of loan quality are lagging and even
though the remarkable growth in the number of banks ceased by 1996, its
repercussions might still be felt in 1997.
Another explanation is growth in the proportion of loss-making enterprises
(about 60% in transport and 50% in industry by 1998) : the pool of potential
borrowers is not of the best quality. In efficient credit allocation in this case is a
logical outcome.16
Payment arrears also contributed their fair share. An intricate web of chain
indebtedness and barter operations tied up the money.
2.2.3.Scale of Operations
The scale of banking in transition is significantly less than that in
comparable market economies, according to the EBRD (1998). Table 2.5. reveals,
the size of the banking sector in Russia is about half the average for transition
economies. (Line 4 explains it in terms of deposits, line 5 in terms of loans.) In
order to facilitate economic growth, banks need to be involved more with lending
to the real sector of economy.
2.2.4. Bank Capital
Bank capital and industrial capital in Russia are closely connected. "About
four-fifths of authorized capital of existing commercial banks was derived from
state enterprise funds" (Entov, 1999). Very often founders of the bank wanted it
not to maximize profit but to serve their needs - mainly providing credit. Mostly
it is due to the fact that the major source of capital was enterprises' funds when
the banking system began to develop. Later, the process would be reversed -
well-established bankswillfight for industrial property: "The struggle among top
Russian bankers for lucrative state assets is for the leading position in oil, gas, and
other export industries as well as communications." (Dinello, 1998).
EBRD (1998) dividedallFinancial Industrial Groups (FIGs) into bank-
led, organized by direct acquisition of industrial firms by banks or a result of
equity-debt swaps and industry-led groups formed by large industrial firms that17
set up their own agent or 'pocket bank'. It also says that formation of FIGs,
encouraged by government through tax privileges and access to financial crediton
favorable terms, brought more costs than benefits through risk of credit and
investment misallocation, risk of collusion between FIGs and government and
risk of banks, having equity stakes at firms (bank is owner and creditor of the
same company).
But apart from this, according to the Table 2.3, equity capital rose from
9.5% to 16.7% of total assets. Such a high level is common in the transition
economies. (See Table 2.5, line 3). But this figure must be adjusted to express
capitaladequacy.6Even though the numbers look good, they may be misleading.
Accounting for losses and inflation will make these numbers more realistic.
2.2.5. Operating Costs
The level of operating expenses is distinctive for Russian banks. Until
1997 high revenues allowed many of them not to pay attention to cost
minimization. As Figure 2.3. shows, the level of operational expenses relative to
assets and operational income is very high for Russian banks. In 1997, over 40%
of operational expenses were paid as interest. Overhead expenses accounted for
15%. (Matovnikov, 1999).
6Russia, CBR was changing the rules for the calculations several times over the last
two years, trying to come up with more or less meaningful procedure.18
2.2.6. Country Factors and Progress of Russian Banking System
A country's overall economic conditions, law enforcement and trust in credit
institutions influence bank performance. According to EBRD (1998), advances in
banking reform and overall progress in transition have a significant negative
impact on net revenues of banks. Its qualitative rating of Russian banking reform
over 1994-1999 is '2', meaning that only liberalization of interest
Figure 2.3. Efficiency of bank operations in some countries
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rates and credit allocation was more or lessestablished.7
Bank solvency, prudent supervision, laws, and regulation leave much to be
desired. In the banking crisis of 1995, the major reason was the tightening of
monetary and fiscal policy, which eventually led to deceleration of inflation and
stabilization of the exchange rate, and consequently, bank earnings deterioration.
In 1998, the crisis embraced the whole economy and had disastrous repercussions
for banking activity. Let's take a look at it more closely.
2.3. The Crisis of 1998
2.3.1. Pre-crisis Situation
The crisis in Russian banking in August 1998 - default on government
securities and moratorium on banks' obligations for 90 days - was only apartof a
bigger financial crisis, which left no stone unturned. There are a number of
explanations of how everything happened, what should have been done and who
was responsible. We will take a look at the main factors of the crisis, emphasizing
the role of banks in the process.
To begin with, all the factors, which were behind the crisis, may be
separated into exogenous and endogenous. (Malleret, Orlova and Romanov,
1999).
Exogenous, or external, factor were:
figure presents the evaluation of the level of development of the banking system as
a whole and is not composed from individual banks performance indicators. Using DEA,
we'll assess relative performance of the banks and put together such numbers.20
2.3.1.1. Capital Flight
The capital outflow from emerging markets due to the Asian crisis and
increase in risk aversion made foreign investors very susceptible to any sign of
worsening the conditions. (Figure 2.4. shows drop in RTS (Russian Trade
System) Index after august 1997 and further on). And there were many of them in
Russia. The first signal was the decrease in the Russian government rating and,
consequently, many Russian banks and companies, by the most influential rating
agencies. (Entov, 1999)
2.3.1.2. Depressed Commodity Prices on the World Markets
In the first half of August 1998, The Economist all-items commodity
prices index had fallen by 30% since mid-1997 and was at its lowest level in real
terms in over 25 years, mainly due to the oil shock. As Figure 2.4. shows, RTS
Index was also down during that time, due to the fact that oil, gas and energy
sector compose 77.5 % of it (Malleret, Orlova and Romanov, 1999). The decline
started with oil companies and rapidly captured other sectors, as volumes shrank.
The number of endogenous factors and their severity was far more crucial.
Illarionov (1999) states it in a very strict form:
"Chief responsibility for the development of fmancial crisis is in fact
borne by the government of Russian Federation, which implements budget
policy,and the CBR, which carries out monetary, credit and currency
policy."21
Figure 2.4. The Russian stock and bond market
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And the main drawbacks of CBR's policy were manipulations of refinancingrate,
enormous foreign borrowings, and mass currency interventions to support
overvalued ruble.
As a starting point, it is helpful to evaluate the effect of the internal factors
on the banking system, following Entov (1999):
2.3.1.3.'Bad'Assets in the Banking System
Several reasons for bad assets piling up can be established. First ofall,payment
arrears were a perpetual problem, due to22
-Demonetization of the economy and wide use of money surrogates;
-Continuation of loans to the unprofitable, ailing enterprises, whichwere kept
alive from Soviet times and were not able to honor their obligations;
Another reason was a misallocation of funds:
-funds were used to buy GKOs as well as to finance the budget deficit in other
forms - claims on government were rising over 1994-1998 (see Figure 2.5.)
High balances of those papers mean risky vulnerability to the deterioration of
asset quality;
-mismatch of deposits and loans based on their maturity: time deposits were
mostly short-term - 3-6 months, while the usual loan period was about one
year.
2.3.1.4. The Crisis of Government Debt
Piling up of government debts and poor debt management was, probably,
the major source of the crisis. Debt service began to crowd out other expenditures
in 1997. According to Table 2.7, in 1997 22.6 % of budget expenditure was
devoted to the interest payments. In 1998 this figure rose to 34.9%. Also, by the
beginning of crisis, interest payments constituted almost 61% of all tax
collections!Figure 2.5. Claims of all Russian banks on the governmentsector and the
enterprise sector in 1994-1998, real volumes in billion Januaiy 1998 rubles.
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Tax collection by itself was a problem. By August 1998, budget
expenditures were only covered by 75% by budgetrevenues. (See Table 2.8.).
Facing a situation of the lack of funds, the government used different
sources. Since inflationary budget fmancing by simply printing the moneywas
no longer an option as of the early '90s, and tax collection was problematic, the
government was forced to sell debt to the public.24
Table 2.7. Interest expenditure of the Federal budget
Indicator 1992199319941995199619971998
In billion of rubles 0.1 3.3 12.252.3125.4114.5148.2
As%of official GDP0.7 1.9 2.0 3.3 5.7 4.4 5.4
As%oftaxpayments
of federal budget
5.4 15.421.830.757.344.560.9
As%ofexpenditures
of federal budget
1.8 7.8 8.6 18.825.822.634.9
Source: Illarionov (1999).
* January-July number annualized
Table 2.8. Federal budget, as a percent of official GDP
Indicator 1992199319941995199619971998
Revenues
Including
taxes
15.613.711.812.213.011.610.6
13.012.49.2 10.89.9 9.4 8.9
Expenditures
Including
transfers
38.024.323.217.622.118.415.5
1.7 2.8 4.2 2.1 3.1 3.8 1.5
Net -22.4-10.6-11.4-5.4-9.1-6.8-4.9
Source: Illarionov (1999).
* January-July number annualized
Both internal and external lenders were attracted to GKOs (see Figure
2.6), since they were government-guaranteed and quite profitable - interest on
them was higher than on deposits (Table 2.9.).25
Figure 2.6. Government debtallocation,8bin $
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Table 2.9. Annual interest rates
Indicator 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
CBR refinance rate180 185 110 32 60 57
Lending rate n.a. 320.2146.832.0 42.0 n.a.
Deposit rate n.a. 102.055.1 16.8 17.1 n.a.
GKO average seco-
ndary market yield
172.3161.885.8 26.0 126.1n.a.
Source: Russian Economis Trends, March 2000
8Since, according to the law, it could not borrow from Central Bank directly, issue of T-
bills was a way to place the debt. (Government securities (or T-bills) were short-term
denominated GKOs and longer-dated coupon-bearing OFZs.)On the one hand, for foreign investors, enforcement of the exchange rate
corridor9and relaxation of the rules for participation were substantial factors.
First, capital controls, limiting foreign access to GKO-OFZ were removed in
early 1998. Liberalized conditions of profit repatriation from the T-bills market
encouraged foreign participation but made capital withdrawal at short notice
more likely. (Malleret, Orlova and Romanov, 1999). Consequently, the
percentage of foreign investors holding GKO increased from 2-3% in 1996 up to
around 30% in 1998, three quarters of GKO was placed outside of the Central
Bank, Sberbank, Vneshtorgbank (Entov, 1999).
Despite the corridor on the ruble value, foreigners were obliged (and many
later chose) to hedge themselves against the risk of devaluation by buying dollar
forward contracts with Russian commercial banks (EBRD, 1998). Russian
commercial banks, in turn, were required to established compensating deals with
CBR. In January 1998 this requirement was dropped, which led to a surge in the
forward market. In August 1998 foreign contracts amounted to an estimated
$200billion'0(Malleret, Orlova and Romanov, 1999), twice the amount of
banking sector assets. (See Table 2.10.)
a stable exchange rate is preferred by foreigners simply because their assets
value is secured.27
Table 2.10. Assets of Russian banking system
Indicator 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997l998
Total assets, bin$ 48.4 56.5 73.8 93.6 104.2100.2
Assets in foreign
currency, bin$
as % of total assets
12.7 13.5 9.9 13.3 11.4 11.6
26.2 23.9 13.5 14.2 10.9 11.6
Obiigations in foreign
currency, bin$
as % of total assets
13.5 14.2 18.4 23.9 32.4 29.3
27.8 25.1 24.9 25.5 31.1 29.3
Net,bln$ -0.8 -0.7 -8.4 -10.6-21.0-17.7
Source: Illarionov (1999)
* January-July number annualized.
Previously, Central Bank was hedging foreign investors' risks and by
withdrawal from this activity it literally transferred currency risks on to
commercial banks' shoulders, and the stability of the whole banking system was
tied up with stability of ruble exchange rate. But we as well should not admit that
excessive risk-taking of many commercial banks was also a big factor,
influencing the situation.
On the other hand, for Russian commercial banks (as well as for the
government), opening up of international markets meant access to the cheaper
funds. However, it made banks very vulnerable to exchange rate fluctuations.
Given the exposure to foreign currency, presented in the Table 2.10, when
the obligations in foreign currency were twice as much as assets in foreign
currency and with estimated forward contract size of $200 bin, it is clear that
figure is the estimate of amount of forward contracts, which fall into 'off-balance-
sheet' category and is not shown in official statistics.28
even a twofold increase in the dollar value would make debt twice as large and
impose very severe problems for its repayment.
Table 2.11. Banks with the largest portfolios of government ruble-denominated
securities, share of portfolio of the entire volume outstanding, in per cent
01/01/96 01/01/98
Sberbank 36.4 26.5
Incombank 0.9 0.9
Vneshtorgbank 0.8 0.8
Avtobank 0.7 0.7
CI1'Ibank T/O 0.4 0.6
Menatep N/a 0.6
Bank Moskvy N/a 0.6
Republic National bank of New York________________
0.4 0.5
Chase Manhattan bank
International
0.9 0.5
Nacionalny Reservny Bank 1.1 0.4
Rossiisky Credit 0.5 N/a
Mosbiznesbank 0.6 N/a
TOTAL 42.6 32.1
Source - Dmitriev et al. (1998)
It is worth noting, that most of the ruble-denominated GKO were placed
with Sberbank, which also holds about 70-80% (according to different estimates-
Mihkailov (1998), Entov (1999)) of total household deposits. That means that
most of savings were used to finance the budget deficit.
The dynamics of debt holding is presented in Table 2.12.29
Table 2.12. Russian banks GKO-OFZ holdings
Date All commercial
banks, ex
Sberbank, R bin
Sberbank,
R bin
GKO-OFZ as
percent of
total assets
January, 1998 53.76 84.48 8
February, 1998 56.33 85.50 9
March, 1998 54.32 91.96 8
Aprii, 1998 56.78 92.09 9
May,1998 56.37 92.99 9
June, 1998 50.88 85.45 8
July, 1998 44.92 84.30 7
Source : Malerret, Orlova, Romanov(1999)
Government debt increased at higher rate than banks' holdings of GKO's.
Figure 2.7. also suggests that those balances were not dominating.
The most crucial role was played by the uncontrolled forward market boom,
which made banks susceptible to foreign investors' sentiments.
2.3.2. Development of the Crisis
During the summer of 1998, the crisis unfolded as following. Crisis of
government debt and political instability (the government had been recently
changed), together with the drop in the stock market, triggered the outflow of
foreign capital. Even an agreement with the IMF on a stabilization package in late
July did not help.
The government tried to retain foreign investors by offering ever-
increasing GKO yields (126% at annualized rate in August of 1998, see Table
2.9).Table 2.7. Major allocation of funds by banks as of 05.31.98, based on asset group
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Financing of budget deficit through inflation- by printing money -
eventually became a reality. Ban/cs, facing the need to honor their hardcurrency
contracts began to sell their assets, starting with the most liquid part- GKOs. Also
they raised the demand for foreign currency." All this put significantpressure on
the ruble. But devaluation did not occur and the exchange rate of the rublewas
maintained. Eventually, CBR's reserves dropped drastically: from June to
September 1998 they fell from $11.2 billion to $8.8 billion (See Figure 2.8).
Certainly, this could not last forever.
Figure 2.8. Currency reserves of Russia
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Source: Malleret, Orlova and Romanov, 1999
To make matters worse, big banks delayed tax payments, and domestic
depositors started runs on the banks, making the situation of Russian banks even
more critical.
" In addition, accordingto the CBR officials (Russian and Baltic Economies, The week
in Review, 02.13.1998) there were 200-300 unstable banks, accounting for only about
4% of total assets. This number rose to about 720 in November, 1998. (same source,
11.20.1998)The bottom of this drastic plummet was the government default on GKOs
and moratorium on commercial bank payments for 90 days.
Licenses of banks, experiencing runs from domestic depositors were suspended.
In sum, the growing budget deficit and government debt coupled with
contagion from Asian markets triggered capital flight and domestic panic. Foreign
investors fought to reclaim their money from time contracts as well. The
mismatch of deposits and loans structure became acute and many banks were not
able to honor their obligations. They were left to their own devices to cope with
the problems which, as noted by Illarionov (1999), were mainly due to the poor
government and CBR policies.
2.3.3. Position of the IMF during the Crisis
While financial markets were goingintorecession, a major stabilization
package of IMF could help to rebuild confidence in Russia's performance. On
July 13, 1998 the agreement on the new credit line was achieved. A week later the
first tranche of $4.8 bin (a part of package of $12.5 bin) was channeled to the
CBR for the purposes of supporting the ruble and relieving the balance of
payments difficulties, connected with thedropin currency earnings and capital
outflow.
In addition, the IMF had several conditions Russia needed to fulfill. Even though
previous agreements also had specific terms, these terms were usually not
achieved, as shown in Table 2.13.33
Table 2.13. The fulfillment of IMF Programs
1995 1996 1997 1998k
Budget deficit as per cent of GDP
IMF Program 4.9 4.0. 3.0 2.0
Actual 5.4 9.1 6.8 5.9
Gross currency reserves in months of
imports IMP Program 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.9
Actual 2.4 2.0 2.4 2.1
Increase in GDP as percent of prior
year IMP Program 2.0 2.3 3.5 5.1
Actual -4.1 -3.5 0.8 -0.5
Source: lllarionov (1999)
* January-July number annualized
This time, IME wanted to have tax revenue increased and to keep
monetary policyinthe existing shape. In part, the requirement were unrealistic.
Tax rates were quite highinRussia and raising them would not bring any
improvement in tax revenue collections. Government tried to make the biggest
debtors pay what they owed to the budget. Among those were the biggest energy
and gas producing Russian monopolies, headed by very powerful so called
'oligarchs'. They resisted this initiative very strongly. But it is understandable
why putting the taxation system in order is one of the main points of the IMP
conditionality: no aid package could substitute for internal source of revenue.
But besides this fundamental requirement, IMP worked closely with the
Russian government to normalize the situation after the crisis (IMF, 1998). First,34
bands for 'currency corridor' were widened. Second, the government needed to
restructure state debt, including the GKO portion. Third, control over the
currency flows was tightened. Fourth, for the banking system stabilization,
arrangement of a pool of the biggest banks to maintain stability of interbank
settlements was advised, together with efforts to consolidate the Russian banking
system. IMF also urged the Russian legislative organ, the Duma, to pass key draft
laws, supporting these measures.
After the initial stage of the recovery after the crisis, IMF paid close
attention to the situation in Russia. In 1999, banksstillwere experiencing
difficulties, resulting from the August 1998 collapse. ARCO, Agency for
Restructuring of Credit Organizations, was established in the 1999 to take care of
the troubled banks. CBR was more strict regulating banks with negative equity,
urged by the IMF. But in case with big and influential banks this approach was
very difficult to implement, since these banks were 'too big to fail'. Efforts to
improve the situation arestillapplied, since the damage of crisis is not easy to
recover.
2.3.4. Banks performance during the Crisis
The adverse effect of the financial crisis can be traced in several ways.
First of all, the share of loss-making banks increased from 16% in July to 24% in
January 1999. Banks, which belong to that group, accounted for 25.7% of assets
of the whole banking system. On an aggregate level, profit of 13.4 bin R in 1997
12 figures for this section were taken from CBR Annual Report (1999) and Expert
(April 1999).35
was followed by the a loss of 45.9 bIn R in 1998. ROA and ROE indicators
turned negative. ROA fell from 0.6 % to -2.9%, while ROE plummeted from
3.1% to -29.4% was just a disaster. Many banks, experiencing hard times had
their licenses revoked. Moscow region had the largest absolute number of the
banks, which lost their licenses.
Second, the changes were also reflected in the banks' assets. Their
absolute amount fell from $88.7 bin to $34.2 bln over the last five months of
1998. Capital loss of the big banks was 57.3%. Interestingly, smaller banks did
not experience this. Their capital did not change and financial performance even
improved. The reason for this is that they were not engaged in OKO trading and
forward market operations and, therefore, avoided the exposure to the most
'devastating' activities. Big banks were honoring their obligations during the
second part of 1998 mostly by 'eating up' their equity.
The quality of banks' credits portfolios as well deteriorated: the proportion
of overdue loans increased from 6.8 % to 11.3%. Loan balances decreased 12.7%
in ruble accounts and 29.3% in dollar accounts.
Oufflow of deposits was also significant. Ruble deposits decreased by
22%, dollar - by 51%.
This dramatic situation was also magnified by the undermined trust in the
banking sector. The Central Bank in collaboration with the IMF is working
towards the implementations of such policy prescriptions as recapitalising
influential banks, whose existence is crucial to the economy, adjusting and
enforcing regulations, such as capital adequacy requirement, withdrawal oflicenses of troubled banks, improving transparency and prudency of the Russian
banking system as a the whole.
In this section we have seen how the performance of the Russian banks
changed during the crisis. This descriptive analysis revealed, that bigger banks
were the ones who suffered the most and engaged in the riskiest activities. Many
separate measures of the performance were presented above, but what follows is
the attempt to use tools of a DEA to evaluate the efficiency differentials and
productivity change of different categories of banks. We will divide them into
good' and 'bad' depending on whether they lost or maintained the licenses in
1998, Moscow and non-Moscow, according to their regional distribution, small
and big with respect to their assets sizes. The model and the tools we are going to
use, are described in the Chapter 3, and the results are presented in the results of
its application are presented in Chapter 4.37
CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL
MODEL
In this Chapter we present some definitions used in the studiesof
efficiency as well as compare the advantagesofDEA framework with parametric
frontier methods for estimationofefficiency. Then we present general DEA
methodology and several applications for the banking industry evaluation.
Finally, we introduce empirical model for the Russian banking sector assessment
and explain choiceofvariables and techniques for the analysis.
3.1. DEA and Other Approaches to Measure Efficiency
3.1.1. Definitions of Efficiency in Studies of Banking Sector of Transition
Economies
Regarding the banking industry in transition economies, the main concern
of many studies (See, for example, Mullineux and Green (1999); Schnitzer
(1999b); Bonin and Szekely (1994); Buch (1996)) is liberalization, privatization
and stabilization. Obviously, those are very important issues, especially in
understanding the nature of transition, which affects the behavior of banking firms
as well.
Studies of efficiency issues are not wide spread and all of the authors use
specific definitions of efficiency.38
Efficiencyofthe banking system has been addressed in Thome (1993). He
attempts to analyze efficiency of banking systems in Hungary, CSFR and Poland,
using as indicators
-trends in domestic credit allocation, especially to the private sector, which
reveal whether banks are giving credit to the best customers;
trends in lending rates and interest rates spreads. "If efficient banks
dominate in the market, their average real lending will be comparable to
that of the German or US banks adjusted for devaluation and risk factors."
Upward tendencies in both cases were found, implying that though positive
changes towards channeling funds to private sector exist, interest rates are not
converging to the standards of developed countries yet.
Efficiencyofcredit allocation is also found to depend on the level of
competition among the banks. Schnitzer (1999) demonstrates, using a model of
spatial competition, that for transition economies, the larger the number of banks,
the more likely are bad loans, and, consequently, the worse the efficiency of
credit allocation.
Pyle (1997) conducted a unique study on Russian banking system's
allocative efficiency in 1996. His survey of regional interest rate discrepancies
showed that loans are relatively 'cheap' and deposits are relatively 'expensive' in
Moscow region.
An interesting study of how efficiency connected with stability was
undertaken by Gorton and Winton (1998). They identify inefficiencies in several
facets:39
-In volumeofcredit creation. In transition economies it is inefficiently small in
a sense that it is smaller than in developed countries and than it is socially
desirable;
-In bank capitalization and allocationofcredit. Requiring banks to raise their
equity makes "undersized" banking system even smaller. Additionally, "ifany
social value is attached to the special services banks produce, the continued
production of these services outweighs forcing the banking system to shrink."
On the flip side, efficient credit allocation implies choosing the best customers
to grant the loans, not state-owned enterprises, which constitute the huge
legacy from pre-reform times and are not the best borrowers.
-In providing transaction media and payments system. In this instance,
'inefficiency' arises when the payments are done and checks are cleared not
quickly and always correctly as in economies with well-developed banking
systems.
The main conclusion was that for the transition economies a certain level
of instability is socially desirable, simply because the costs of achieving stability
are too high for the society. When banks fail, unique information on their
customersso called 'private charter value' is lost forever and is needed to be
regained, which is not efficient from the society point of view.
Another way to approach efficiency issues is to evaluate particular firms
within an industry and then aggregate the indexes to get a 'bigger picture'.
Various measures can be used to this end. The simplest one is profitability. Fare,40
Grosskopf and Weber (1999) caution, however, that it is not certain" how one
should treat cases in which observable or maximal profit are zero".
To the best of my knowledge, "the cross-country analysis of bank
profitability in transition economies is the only such study available for the post-
communist countries" (EBRD, 1998). Studies, concerning particular countries, are
alsorare.2
Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998) used stochastic frontier approach to estimate
X-efflciencies and scale efficiencies in Croatia in 1994-1995. Warner (1998)
linked tremendous growth in the number of Russian banks to the profitability of
the banking industry in the mid '90s.
In this study, we use the well-established methodology of Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to study efficiency of Russian banks before and
after the financial crisis of 1998.
In DEA analysis term 'efficiency' is measured in two dual ways: as minimization
of input(s) use for the production of certain amount(s) of output(s) or as
maximization of output(s) from given amount(s) of input(s).Efficientfirm, thus, is
the one, which does this better than others.
Following Section 3.1.2 provides comparison of DEA with parametric
frontier models used to estimate efficiency and we describe theoretical
foundations of DEA in detail in Section 3.2.
'This paper also provides the review of studies on profit efficiency applied to the
banking industry.
2do believe that such studies exist. They may not available though due to the fact that
they may not have been published with journals we had access to or translated into
English.41
3.1.2. Comparison of Parametric and Non-parametric Methods for Efficiency
Evaluation
This study uses a non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to
measure inefficiencies. DEA, a non-parametric approach, uses a linear
programming technique where best practice perfonners, identified from data,
form a frontier. All others are considered inefficient and can be presented as
projections to the convex linear combinations of the firms, which construct the
frontier. Yet, an alternative way to estimate efficiency uses parametric methods.
Although, as accurately pointed out by Berger and Humphrey (1997), "it is
impossible to determine which of the two major approaches dominates the other
since the true level of efficiency is unknown". Table 4.1. compares distinctive
features of the two.
Table 3.1. Comparison of parametric and non-parametric approaches
Non-parametric Parametric
FunctionalNo imposition of functional formFunctional form is specified
form is required
Data No information on prices is neededPrice data are not necessary for
to evaluate technical efficiency estimation of production frontier
Error termNo assumption about error term isError term is recognized, assumed
done, total deviation is assigned toto consist of two parts-statistical
inefficiency, noise and inefficiency with one-
sided distribution
It is necessary to mention that using DEA explicitly allows for such
factors as heterogeneity of variables and disposability (which are described in42
more detail further on). In addition, DEA is particularly rewarding where it is
difficult to measure output in monetary terms, e.g. in non-profit and service
sectors, since technical and scale efficiency evaluation along with productivity
growth can be done using only the data on physical amounts of inputs and
outputs.
3.2. Measures of Efficiency in DEA
3.2.1. Technical and Allocative Efficiency Measures
The general theoretical foundations of what is now called DEA- Data
Envelopment Analysis were laid out by Farrell (1957) in his pioneering work
when he introduced the relative efficiency measurement of production units. He
defined an efficient firm as one "producing as large as possible an output from a
given set ofinputs".Firms, which satisf' this requirement, belong to the isoquant;
others are ranked relative to them. For the simple two-input casepointsB, C and
D represent efficient firms and together produce a piece-wise linear frontier(See
Figure 4.1.). Producer at point A is not utilizing the resources to the full extent
and is thus considered inefficient. It is worth mentioning that the frontier is
identified from data, since the true technology remains unknown. Farrell (1957)
emphasized the importance of using an observed standard in contrast to "some
unattainable ideal".43
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Figure 3.1. The input measure of technical efficiency
The measure of technical efficiency of A is OK/OA. Intuitively, firm A can
reduce the consumption of inputs by 1- OK/OA and still produce the same amount
of output.
Within this framework, allocative efficiency can be defined using the
relationship between isoquant and isocost (shown by the lineEFon Figure 3.1.).
The point of tangency is providing the optimal input mix. In the Figure 3.1.
0110K measures allocative (or in Farrell's words price) efficiency of A. Again, A
may reshuffle its input bundle to increase production and maintain costs at the
previous level.
Once technical and allocative efficiencies are defined, overall efficiency,
is the product of technical and allocative efficiencies: OL/OA = OK/OA *0110K
So far, we tried to see if the firm can contract its inputs while holding the
level of output constant. Another way to evaluate efficiency is to consider by how44
much a firm can expand its outputs, given the amount of inputs. Decomposition
into technical and allocative components is done in the same fashion.
Following Fare and Grosskopf (l996), formally defined, the Farrell
Input-Saving Measure of Technical Efficiency is
F1(y,x)= min{2 :AxE L(y)};
where L (y) is Input Requirement Set and A <1 equals to OK/OA.
Similarly, the Farrell Output-Oriented Measure of Technical Efficiency is
1 (y, x)-,nax(O.OxEP(x)},
where P (x) is the Output Possibility Set and 8>1 is the expansion factor.
Farrell's work was extended in several directions. More specifically,
information on scale efficiency can be extracted using Farrell's measures by
employing the concepts of constant returns toscale4(CRS) and variable returns to
scale (VRS), as illustrated by Fare and Cirosskopf (1994). They as well showed
that the output-oriented and input-oriented measures yield the same result under
CRS.
3.2.2. Scale Efficiency Measures
Scale efficiency - SE, - is calculated as a ratio of Farrell efficiency scores under
VRS and CRS. In Figure 3.2. for observation E
SE, = (Oxt/OXE / (OXE/ OXE =Oxt/OXE.
Their notation is used throughout this paper unless otherwise mentioned.y
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Figure 3.2. The scale efficiency measure
RS
This expression can be restated to show that overall efficiency OE, is a
product of pure technical efficiency TE, and scale efficiencySE,:
OE, = TE, * SE,('OXE/ Ox& * ('Oxi/OXE).
Putting pieces together, we may construct the whole activity analysis
model which also incorporates the linear programming (LP) problem to be solved
for every production unit:
CRS framework implies that proportional changes in outputs require proportional
changes in inputs. Mathematically,L(8yICRS) = 8L (yCR), 8>0.For VRS this equality
need not to hold.46
F,(y,x)=min{2:AxEL(y)}
Under CRS:
>ZkY Ym
>ZkX, Ax,,
Zk0
Under VRS:
ZkY Ym
ZkX Ax,
SE,(y,xS)=F(y,xC)/F,(y,xV)
Here A, as before, is the fraction by which a firm may reduce its inputs and
still is able to maintain the previous output level. Also, n and m denote inputs and
outputs respectively and k represents the number of observations. Importantly, z is
the vector of intensity variables which constructs the technology from convex
combination of observed inputs and outputs.
3.2.3. Some Extensions to the Model
There are also a number of extensions to this basic model. One may want
to account for input or output congestion using the notion of weak disposability of
inputs when an increase in inputs causes "congestion"-lower production of
outputs, or weak disposability of outputs when proportional reduction of one of
the outputs is not feasible, as stated in Fare and Grosskopf (1994).47
Another feature is controlling for the heterogeneity of inputs or outputs
with the help of environmental variables, which are the ones exogenously
determined and therefore are not under the manager's control. Banker and Morey
(1986) provide a discussion of this problem.
More sophisticated models are used to evaluate cost, revenue or profit
efficiency. For this purpose price information on inputs and/or outputs is needed.
Chames et al. (1978) presented alternative approach to illustrate efficiency
measure-as a ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs compared to the
maximum possible, using u as a weight of r-th output and v as a weight of i-th
input for everyj-th observation:
S S
U,.Y,j UrJ',,
max subject to 1. m
v.x vIxJ
II i-i
3.2.4. Malmguist Productivity Index
Within a dynamic framework DEA can also be used to measure
productivity growth.5 As it is shown (Grosskopf, 1993), a non-parametric
alternative to Total Factor Productivity (TFP) measure, the Malmquist
Productivity Index (MPI), shares all features, common to its non-parametric
peers. Its most distinctive characteristic is the power to compare two periods t and
t+1 and to allow for decomposition into technological change and efficiency
change:
5Their comparative description is summarized in Grosskopf (1993).48
x,y,x,y)={
1+1 1+1 1 I
D:+'(
1+1 i±1\ X ,y
1+1 1+1D'( 1+1 1+1 x ,y) x,y)}I/2
D;(x',y') D;'(x',y')
D:(1+1
1+1 x ,y)D;(x',y') }I/2
1 1+1 D;'(x',y) D;'(x',y')
= Efficiency change*Technological change
In this case, distance functions(D,),the reciprocal of Farrellmeasures6,
are used to represent the state of efficiency.
To conclude, a battery of efficiency measures are well established and
readily available for use. Though imperfect, they are easily interpreted and can be
readily calculated using specially designed (OnFront ©) or adjusted (GAMS 0)
computer software. Taking advantage of this, many studies have been conducted.
Section 3.3. presents some of them, which were applied to the banking industry
assessment, together with issues of measuring inputs and outputs, specific to
banking sector.
6
See Fare and Grosskopf (1994).49
33. Using DEA for Banking Industry Assessment
3.3.1. Approaches for Measurement of Outputs and Inputs in Banking
Numerous studies on banking have addressed different issues and have
used different methodologies. Before going in depth discussing them, it is worth
noting some details, specific to banking. As for any other service sectors, there is
difficulty in defining the output. Several approaches are used to resolve this
problem as shown by Triplett (1992) and Berger et al. (1992).
The traditional National Accounts approach identified bank output in
terms ofvalue added,taking the difference between deposits inflow and loans
VA_iD r,L,,
Where i- interest on deposits
- volume of deposits
r, -merest on loans
L. - volume of loans
outflow:
However, such a formulation ignores that banks also provide
complementary services for depositors as well as borrowers. They are important
in a sense that banks use their resources to provide these complimentary services
and efficiency is underestimated if they are disregarded. Berger et al. (1992)
present the idea of value added in a different light. All liabilities and assets have
some output characteristics and can be viewed as outputs if they have significant
value added. In practical applications some deposit (time, demand, savings) and
loan (real estate, commercial, installment) categories are treated as outputs, while50
purchased funds (CDs, federal funds, foreign deposits, other liabilities for
borrowed money) enter as inputs.
Another approach 'production' or 'activity approach'- "takes any bank
activity that absorbs real resources as bank output" as described by Triplett (1992)
- is often combined with value added, presented above.
Another way of treating a bank as a production unit is to assume that it
transforms deposits into loans. This is reflected in the 'asset' or 'intermediation'
approach. In this case deposits as well as traditionally labor and capital are
considered to be inputs and loans are considered to be outputs. This view ignores
that banks also provide liquidity, payments and safekeeping services to their
depositors to obtain the funds, as pointed out by Berger et al. (1992).
Alternatively, the user cost approach was studied by Hancock (1991) and
extended by Fixler and Zieschang (1992) and Fixler (1993). They suggested that
financial services are attached to "each money unit in a fmancial product", which
in turn, may be either assets or liabilities. The criterion to distinguish between
inputs and outputs is its net contribution to bank revenue. Berger et al. (1992)
summed it up in the following way: "If the financial returns on an asset exceed
the opportunity cost of funds or if the financial costs of a liability are less than
opportunity cost, then the instrument is considered to be a fmancial output."
Empirical study by Hancock (1992) showed that loans and demand deposits had
attributes of outputs, while time deposits areinputs.
Another important issue is related to the best way to measuring bank's
output, especially in the light of described approaches. Production and user cost51
approaches are usually identified with the numbers of accounts of deposits and
loans as a proxy for unpriced services, produced by the banks. On the other hand,
the intermediation approach is associated with monetary volumes, not number of
accounts, as the output measure.
In addition to those characteristics, we may choose between stock and
flow measures of output. In an empirical investigation Humphrey (1992) pointed
out that even though output is not a stock, but a flow, "policy prescriptions
contained in the existing literature, which has almost always used themore
readily available stock measures, are reasonably robust to the measure, chosen to
indicate banking output."
There should also be an account for the quality of output, since loansare
not homogeneous. As shown in a recent study by Berger et aL(1997), commercial
loans differs in size, riskiness, time of repayment and type of collateral. Such
variety of characteristics affects bank's process of issuing a loan and monitoring
it. Thus "unmeasured differences in product quality may be incorrectly measured
as differences in cost efficiency". In an attempt to control for this feature, the
level of non-performing loans has been used as a proxy for the quality of this
output in a recent study by Berg et al. (1993). Resti (1997) incorporated the
quality of assets by relating efficiency scores with BTL (bad loans/total loans)
ratio. Berger and Mester (1997) pointed out that "failure to control for equity
could yield a scale bias". This is explained by the fact that large banks use debt
financing (bigger leverage) more often. Additionally, well-capitalized banks were
found to be more efficient.52
In addition, accounting for a rise in non-traditional banking activities
over the last 30 years, Rogers (1998) suggested using net non-interest income asa
proxy for those activities and showed that efficiency scores for banks highly
engaged in those activities improved with the inclusion of thisnew variable. A
supporting conclusion is also provided by DeYoung (1994). His analysis revealed
that banks producing large volumes of fee-based activities, such as fiduciary
services, mortgage servicing, cash management, mutual funds sales,are more cost
efficient than their peers. This can be explained by the fact that fee-based
activities are "technology intense" and help keep expenses down. In addition, the
market for those services is very competitive and only cost efficient finnscan
succeed.
3.3.2. Studies of Banking Sector Efficiency
DEA models were as well extensively used for analyzing banking firms.
Their advantage is the ability to incorporate multiple inputs and multiple outputs
as well as various forms ofconstraints.7
7A successful attempt to incorporate risk-based capital requirements into evaluation of
efficiency of banking firms with DEA procedures was done in Fare, Grosskopf and
Weber (1999) by introducing an additional constraint into LP problem formulation.Though this framework does not require profit-maximizationassumption
and does not explicitly account for the marketstructure8,it proved to give
meaningful results and to serve its purpose to give the estimation of 'whodoes
better'.
There are a number of studies, which use different versions of the
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described approaches to identify inputs and outputs and to address various issues
concerning banking industry. Table 3.2. presents some of them.
We will focus the attention here on the several papers that useda DEA
approach to evaluate banking sector activities.
Applications of DEA to the banking sector can be divided intomany groups on
the grounds of
1) the particular approach of identifying inputs and outputs and model
specification;
2) the comparison between methodological frameworks;
The assumption of profit maximization in economic theory suggests that all inefficient
firms in the situation of perfect competition are driven out from the market by theirmore
successful competitors. However, it may be not true representation of reality and
inefficiencies may persist due to the variety of factors, such as regulations, barriers to
entry, "managers' attempt to maximize their own well-being instead of profits",as noted
by Evanoff and Israilevich (1994). Further, perfect competition would imply that all
firms, which continue to operate, are efficient and allof themconstitute the frontier.
Again, as conditions for perfect competition are not met in reality,we allow for both
inefficiencies and relaxation of profit maximization assumption.
The most thorough and wide survey on efficiency of financial institutions has been
done by Berger et al.(1997). This study presents the survey of 130papers on frontier
efficiency analysis applied to financial institutions in 21 countries. Comprehensive and
simple description of the general DEA model, applied to banking,can be found in
Evanoff and Israilevich (1990). They depicted common efficiencymeasures with respect
to inputs, outputs, scale efficiency, gave basic ideas about advantages and disadvantages
of parametric and non-parametric methods and put togethera universal example of LP for
the financial sector.3) the way of incorporating DEA results into a broader research framework;
4)the number of countries involved in the research (therewere single-country
studies and cross-country ones);
In fact, we usually can not distinguish between the four of thosevery
clearly.
54Table 3.2. Studies on banking efficiency using DEA
Author Variables Data used Model and Important
Inputs Outputs contributions
Aly et al.Labor-number of employeesReal estate loans 1986 (322) Cost efficiency;
(1990) Capital-book value of Commercial loans FDIC Call Report
premises and fixed assets Consumer loans Comparison of branch and unit
IA Loanable funds-time and Demand deposits USA banks and how efficiency relates
savings deposits, notes, other to size and area.
borrowed funds
Ferrier Labor-number of employeesDemand deposits 1984 (575) Cost efficiency, scale efficiency;
and LovellCapital-occupancy costs andTime deposits Fed Functional cost
(1990) expenditure on furniture andReal estate loans Analysis Comparison of stochastic cost
equipment Installment loans frontier andnon-stochastic
IA Other-Expenditure on Commercial loans USA production frontier results; use of
materials environmental variables
Favero Labor-number of employeesLoans 1991 (174) Technical and scale efficiency;
and PapiCapital-book value of fixedSecurities and bondsCentrale dei Bilanci
(1995) assets Non-interest income -ABI data set Try to account for fmancial
Loanable funds-current capital, available for investment
IA, AA savings accounts Italy
I-fl
U,Table 3.2. Continued
English Labor Investment income 1982 (442) Output technical and allocative
et al. Capital-occupancy expenseReal estate loans Fed Functional efficiency (retrieving shadow
(1993) Deposits Consumer loans cost Analysis prices)
Borrowings Commercial loans
USA
Resti Labor-number of Loans 1988-1992 (270) Cost efficiency;
(1997) employees) Deposits
Capital-net fixed assets Non-interest income Italy Comparison of parametric and
VA, UC non-parametric techniques,
accounting for quality of assets
Zaim Labor-number of employeesDemand deposits 198 1(42) Cost efficiency, allocative
(1995) Capital-depreciation Time deposits 1990(56) efficiency;
expenditure and materials Short term loans Bank Association
IA expenditure Long-term loans of Turkey Usage of environmental variables
Interest expenditure
Barr et al.Labor-salary expense Earning assets (loans,Population of the Incorporate DEA efficiency score
(1994) Capital-premises and fixedsecurities,federal banks failed frominto failure prediction model as a
asets funds) 1986 through 1988proxy for quality of management
Non-interest expense Interest income and sample of
Interest expense Non-interest incomebanks survived
Purchasedfunds through 1989
USATable 3.2. Continued
WheelockTime and savings deposits Loans and bonds 1910 -1926 [for Output-oriented technical
and Labor-number of employeesDemand deposits even years] (259) efficiency;
Wilson Capital-book value of
(1995) premises Kansas banks Incorporate into time-to failure
Borrowed funds model DEA scores
UC USA
FukuyamaLabor-number of employeesRevenue from loans 1991 (143) Technical and scale efficiency;
(1993) Capital-presides and Revenue from other Analysis of
equipment activities financial Comparison of efficiency by
IA Deposits and borrowed funds Statements of organizational form
Banks
Japan
Grifell Labor-number of employeesLoan accounts 1986 (61) Comparisons of productive
and LovellNon-labor expenses Savings accounts 1993 (67) efficiency in commercial and
(1997) Capital-expenditure on Checking accounts Central bank of saving banks using output-based
buildings and amortization Spain Malmquist index
Berg et alCapital Loans 1990 (503 FinnishTechnical and scale efficiency;
(1993) Labor Deposits 105 Norwegian
Branches 126 Swedish) Use of Malmquist index for
VA Official bank intercountry comparisons
statisticsTable 3.2. Continued
Pastor etNon-interest expenses Loans 1992 (168 UU Technical and scale efficiency;
al. Personal expenses Other productive 45 Austria
(1997) assets- 59 Spain Comparison of efficiency among
short term investments22Germany countries, usage of Malmquist
Deposits-demand, 18 Uk index
VA time, interbank 31 Italy
17 Belgium
67 France)
IBCA Ltd (London)
WorthingtLabor-number of employeesCall deposits 1993/94 (269) Use distance function and
on Branches Term deposits 1996/97 (269) Malmquist index for productivity
(1999) Member funds Personal loans comparison between two periods
Capital-equipment and Residential loans Australian
VA, IA premises Commercial loans Financial
Financial liabilities Other fmancial Institutions
investments Commission
00As Table 3.2. shows, the studies employed variety of approaches, but
there's no consistency and clarity in defining approaches and using appropriate
variables for them. There is as well a notable difference in data aggregation-
some use such broad groups as loans, others split it in subcategories. These facts
can partly be explained that when choosing the model, the availability of data is
an important factor to consider. Besides, the desire to employ as much
information as possible to make the efficiency scores more accurate also leads to
the justifiable merger of approaches.
A group of studies were devoted to compare results, yielded by DEA
models, with other approaches to measure efficiency. Ferrier and Lovell (1990)
found that parametric and non-parametric approaches reveal different
uncorrelated ranking of banks by technical efficiency. But at thesame time
overall efficiency was in "substantial agreement". They explained this by the fact
that even though the non-parametric frontier takes any randomerror for
inefficiency, it "envelops data more closely" and, therefore, the discrepancy
between the results of two approaches is not considerable. Resti (1997) showed
that depending on the technique used the results can vary significantly. This is
based on her investigation of Italian banking sector, using both parametric and
non-parametric models. Barr and Siems (1998) compared DEAscores with
CAMEL rates and found that most of the efficient banks were as well prudent.
Their suggestion is to use DEA as an additional surveillance technique.
There has been an effort to use efficiency scores in the models, explaining
bank failures. Wheelock and Wilson (1995) evaluated technical efficiency forasample of US banks for the even years between 1910 and 1926 and found that
"failing banks were less inefficient than surviving banks." They also showed that
inclusion of a measure of output technical inefficiency as an independent variable
into a proportional hazard model increased the model's explanatory power.
Similarly, Barr et al. (1994) proposed to use efficiency score from DEA modelas
a proxy for management quality in a probit failure prediction model and
discovered that it improves the model's accuracy.
Investigation of inefficiencies led to findings concerning the sources of
inefficiencies. Fukuyama (1993) studied the relationship between organizational
form of banks and their efficiency, Favero and Papi (1995) established the
relationship between inefficiency and availability of financial capital. Aly et al.
(1990) compared branch and unit banks, while Grifell and Knox Lovell (1997)
compared Italian savings and commercial banks. Zaim's (1995) analysis confirms
that financial liberalization improved efficiency of Turkish banks.
Studies of inter-country comparisons performed by Berg et al. (1993) and
Pastor et al. (1997) utilized the Malmquist productivity index. Worthington
(1999) used the decomposition of Malmquist index for evaluation of productivity
growth in Australian credit unions.
To assess allocative efficiency English et al. (1993) proposed to use
duality between output distance function and revenue function and retrieve
shadow prices.61
As a usual attribute, many studies consider scale economies. Calculation
of those are found in Fukuayama (1993), Ferrier and Knox LoveIl (1990),Berg et
al.(1993), Favero and Papi (1995), Zaim (1995).
For better characteristic of conditions under which banks operate, itwas
found beneficial to use so-called environmental,or categorical, variables, which
are assumed to be exogenously defined or beyond the manager's control. Zaim
(1995) and Ferrier and Lovell (1990) used additional informationon number of
branches, type of credit institution, its location andaverage size of deposits and
loans for this purpose.
In this study, we've borrowed elements from previous works. It helped in
determination of model specification, choice of efficiency measures and variables
as well as in explanations of the results and sources of inefficiencies. We mention
them as we proceed.
3.4. Empirical Model for the Russian Banking Sector Evaluation
3.4.1.Description of the Model
Following theoretical framework of DEA introduced in Section 3.2.,
assume we have K banking firms each producing M outputs y and employing N
inputs x. In addition, R inputs e are quasi-fixed in the sense that they cannot be
altered over the short term. In this case technology may be represented by Input
Requirement Set L(y), implying CRS, can be described in terms of the activity
analysis model as:L(y)={(xI,...,xN):
ZkYkJnYmm=1,...,M;
x, nl,...,N;
r=l ,...,R;
Zk O, k=1 ,...,K}.
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Consistent with the assumption of minimization of resource use, the LP
problem for the input-based Farrell efficiency measure F, and underlying scale
efficiency SE, is:
F(y,x)=min{:AxL(y)},s. t.
underCRS:
ZkYkJ,Ymm=l,...,M;
ZkXJ,AXfl,n=l,...,N;
zkek,er,r=l,...,R;
ZkO,k=1,...,K;
underVRS.
K
m=1,...,M;
k=1
K
>ZkX,AXfl,n=1,...,N;
kJ
K
>zkeeT, r=1,...,R;
k=1
K
Zk =1,k=1 ,...,K;
k=1
SE,(y,x)=F,(y,xjCRS)/F,(y,xVRS).
While DEA framework does not require any assumption of profit-
maximizing behavior, choosing input or output orientation implies that firms try
either to reduce inputs or expand outputs. Concerning Russian banking system, it
is hard to say which one or both apply. Therefore, we, as well, run output-oriented
specification with technology identified with the help of Output Possibility SetF(y,x) = max(9 :9 xe P(x))
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We need, obviously, full activity analysis model to calculate technical and scale
efficiency scores:
P(y,x)=max(9:9xEP(x)},s. t.
under CRS:
K
>.ZkYOYm1 m=1,...,M;
k=I
K
X,,,n =1,...,N;
k=1
K
>zkek,e,, r=1 ,...,R;
k=1
ZkO,k=1,...,K;
underVRS:
K
>ZkYk,,,6Ym' m = 1,...,M;
k=I
K
ZXk11x, n=1,...,N;
k=1
K>zkeer, r=1,...,R;
k=I
K
Z =1,k=1 ,...,K;
SE0(y,x)=F,(y,xCRS)/F,(y,xIVRS).
Later we shall see that the results produced by the different models convey
very similar information. But we need to note here that under CRS and VRS in
our case, we won't get exactly the same result for output and input orientations.
this is due to the fact that we hold some inputs quasi-fixed for input orientation,
while for output orientation we do not distinguish between the two types of
inputs.
For comparison of the pre and post crisis situations, Malmquist
Productivity Index (MPI) and its decomposition are utilized. We want to infer
what was the major cause of productivity growth (regress) by using MPI
decomposition into technical change, which represents frontier shift, and
efficiency change.64
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Efficiency Change*Technological Change.
To obtain efficiency scores, we need to specify inputs and output for the
model. Their choice is described in the next subsection 3.4.2. But even having the
scores themselves is not enough to make meaningful conclusions. One needs to
use additional tools in order to determine the source of the inefficiencies. In other
words, measuring the scores and relating them to some determinants is called for.
"... Computing individual efficiency scores really was not enough for either
consulting purposes or for policy analysis," as stated in Cirosskopf (1996).
10We
explain how we go about it in subsection 3.4.3.
3.4.2. Choice of Variables
In relation to the papers, described in 3.3.2, an intermediation approach is
applied and, consistently, using of monetary values (not physical units) for
measurement anddepositsas an input.
Table 3.3. describes the variables, chosen for application. Though the
definitions are straightforward, some clarification is required.
'°In this work many applied approaches as well as theoretical advancesare
discussed in order to put together the tools, available for practical use, and theoretical
backgrounds, supporting the inference.65
First, labor, capital, other expenses and non-interest income are defined in
flow terms, all others are stock variables. It should not be a problem ina sense
that flow variables can always be presented as stock variables, weighted using
some coefficient (Resti, 1997).
Second, we use salary expenses for physical labor gauge since the banking
industiy is quite competitive and the salary rate is approximately stable across the
banks. In this light it is just scaling up of physical units of hours worked by the
same factor.
On the other hand, if the wage rate differs, it is reasonable to think that the
difference is due to the quality of labor and salary expense gives even better
information on this variable than plain number of workers.
Third, non-interest income serves as a proxy for non-traditional activities,
following Rogers (1998). l'his category is especially important for Moscow
banks, since such activities usually require a bigger scale of operation and better
infrastructure, which are distinctive features of banking in the Russian capital.
Fourth, equity is included to control for the riskiness of bank's operations,
since well-capitalized banks were found to be more stable as well, according to
Berger and Mester (1997).
"In general, it would be ideal to correct all variables for regional differences,so we have
efficiency scores which are not contaminated by the territorial disproportions. But such a
correction, obviously, is too demanding and practically infeasible when it comes to the
data.Table 3.3. Description of the variables
VariableVariable name Definition
yj Loans Total loan balances, monetary volume
.y2 Government securitiesSecurities balances, monetary volume
y3 Non-interest income Net fee-based income, net revenue from
security and currency trading
Xj Labor Salary expenses
X2 Capital Premises and equipment
X3 Deposits Total deposit balances, monetary volume
x5 Other expenses Overhead expenses, commercial expenses,
expenses for advertising, etc.
x4 Other borrowed fundsOther than deposits, including interbank
loans
Equity Paid-in capital corrected for losses
Fifth, loan balances were not corrected for the degree of riskiness. Though
risk coefficients are available through the CBR, the data does not allow us to
distinguish among different types of loans (in terms of their time length,
collateral, and performance).
Lastly, default on government securities (Russian equivalent of Treasury
bills) was one of the major factors of increased weakness of many banks' balance
sheets and therefore, accounting for this fact needs to be demonstrated. But using
this additional output will obviously make good banks, which did not overindulge
in holding GKO, look worse than those one which had big balances of this item.
In this vein, we estimate two models - with and without GKO and
compare theoutcomes.'2
12In DEA analysis it is difficult to get a counterpart for goodness-of-fit measure, as in
regression analysis and this is one of the widely used way to handle this problem.67
3.4.3. Change in Efficiency of Russian Banks
The main purpose of this study is to evaluate how the efficiency of
Russian banks changed over 1997- 1998, namely after the most recent financial
crisis. Two samples of banks were collected in these periods, and examined in the
following manner.
First, we evaluate efficiency in these samples separately in eachyear and
present and compare aggregated measures for the whole banking industry.
Second, following Wilson and Wheelock (1995) who studied the
relationship between failure of a bank with its efficiency, we suggest that
financial crisis might have affected banking industry in a number ofways,
presented in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4. The effect of financial crisis
Effect of 'Good' banks 'Bad' banks
crisis 1997 1998 1997 1998
Scenario 1 Inefficient Inefficient
Scenario 2 Inefficient Inefficient
Scenario 3 Inefficient Inefficient
Scenario 4 Inefficient -.- Inefficient
Two points are worth noting about Table 3.4. On the one hand, the
definition of 'good' and 'bad' is at our discretion (profitability, efficiency,
prudence, liquidity, etc. may be employed), but at any rate sound reasoning
should be a ground for such a distinction. On the other hand, the characteristic by
which to split must be clear. To our view, a binomial measure is the most
appropriate, since if a characteristic is a continuous variable, it is difficult to68
justify the particular value or range, which serves as a ground for the split. To
avoid this, we separate banks in both years into two subsamples- those, who kept
their licenses in 1998 and those who had them revoked in 1998. Asa result, we
obtained four subsamples. The fact of license withdrawal we consideras evidence
offailure'3and 'bad' banks are those that failed in 1998.
Then we explore how the subsamples differ withineach yearand
whether they belong to the same population. Another thing to look at is the
change in efficiency in the same subsample categoryacross the years.By doing
so,allof the Scenarios are feasible to test, since it is possible to compare the
banks in given subsamples and state unambiguously where the efficiency is
higher. 'Efficient' in Table 3.4. actually means 'more efficient than another
subsample'. But here we as well need to test whether the efficiency difference is
significant or not.
Finally, we try to explain inefficiencies in relation with the factors, which
may cause them, as well as we attempt to interpret the decompositions of the
scores. We also divide samples according to the regional principle - Moscow and
non-Moscow banks are assumed to scoredifferently.'4In addition, dividing
samples according to the bank's size (based on assets), we may establish to which
extent this factor is important for efficiency score interpretation.
13Though, it may not be the case in general. The Central Bank may support important
banks, which otherwise would fail. There may be another case when banks disappear: a
voluntary decision of shareholders to close a bank (technically, in this case the license is
also revoked) or situation of merger are the most appealing examples.
saw that this is a good ground for distinction in Chapter 2.CHAPTER 4. DATA SET AND RESULTS
In this Chapter we describe the propertiesofthe sample we are using for
the model implementation and explain the efficiency and productivity differentials
with the helpofdividing samples for 1997 and 1998 into subsamples basedon
various class/Ications.
4.1. Data Set Description
4.1.1. Flaws in the Data
The data set for this study is based on the banks' statements, taken from
the Central Bank of Russia web site (w.cbr.ru). Thus, one may think that the
information provided is consistent and reliable. In addition, each bank had its
balance sheet and profit and loss statement inspected by a registered auditing
firm. But a number of flaws remain.
First, there are general considerations about how well accounting
information represents the true nature of things. Cireenbaum and Thakor (1995)
argue that "the bank balance sheet reflects a complex mix of disparate valuation
practices that confound the best efforts at interpretation". Their main point is that
the practice of intangible assets valuation (cost of license, trademark, goodwill) is
very often arbitrary. Earning assets, such as loans and securities, valuation may be
done using adjusted historical cost, original cost or market value approach,
depending on whether assets are held for trading purposes or as an investment.70
Second, there are loopholes in the law specific to Russia, which banksuse
in order to avoid high taxes.' Hiding profits is as wella common practice for
many countries, where the rule of law is not properly enforced.
Third, some issues are specific to this particular data set. It is not required
for banks to post the information on the web. Besides, many banks do not find it
essential to do so after their license has been revoked. Therefore, the samplemay
suffer from the self-selection bias (Greene, 1998)2. In our case thismeans that
banks with revoked licenses will be underrepresented.
Representativeness is another issues here. Table 4.1. and Table 4.2. reveal
that for 1997 the sample contains about 10 % of the population, and for 1998-
about 7 % of the population.
Table 4.1. Total number of banks registered by CBR for the period of interest
Total numberCumulative Change in
Date of regist:rednumber of number of
licenses licenses
revoked revoked
01/01/1997 2589 570
01/01/1998 2552 852 282
01/01/1999 2481 1004 152
'For example, all finns must make social security payments, whichare based on the total
salary expenditure and amount up to 40% on top of it. To avoid such a problem, many
banks devise special benefit plans for their employees, which do not fall into category of
salary expenses. As a result, they accrue only minimal amount as salary expenditure, and,
therefore, this variable may be underestimated. (My own experience).
2 banks are required by law to publish their statements in the local newspapers.
Other public dissemination of information is not compulsory (except for the customers of
the bank and shareholders, who have every right to examine it).71
Table 4.2. Banks in the sample
Period With license in
both periods
License revoked
in 1998
Total number
1997 139 137 276
1997 adjusted 139 129 268
1998 137 37 174
1998 adjusted 136 29 165
But the proportion of banks with revoked licenses in 1998 is
approximately the same: 15.5% lost their licenses in the total population (based
on the Table 2.1, Chapter 2), while in the sample we have 17.5% of such banks.
Concerning the regional structure, about 43% (for both years under
consideration, CBR data) of all Russian banks belong to the Moscow region. In
our sample, 45.9% of banks are from Moscow for 1997 and 49% for 1998.
But funds allocation for our sample does not match the population
numbers very closely (See Table 4.3.). It is due to the fact that the sample
contains bigger banks, while small and the smallest banks are underrepresented.
Table 4.3. Some indicators for 1998, as % of total assets
Indicator Sample result Population Result*
ILoan balances 50.4% 40%
Deposit balances 70% 49%
LEquity 20% 17%
*Source. CRB, 199972
Adjustments. First, in order to have consistency between years, data for
1998 was corrected with the help of CPI (provided by CBR). All monetary values
are presented in thousand of Russian rubles of 1997.
Second, a number of observations were deleted from the sample dueto
negative equity capital, since the solution of LP problem is not feasible with
negative numbers. There are 8 banks excluded for this reason from 1997 sample
and 9 for 1998. (Table 4.2.) But only the subsample of 1998 with revoked licenses
is sensitive for thisadjustment3,primarily due to its relatively small size (37
initially) and the fact that most of the exclusion was done from this subsample.
Industry structure. Due to the special features of development of the
Russian bankingsystem4,an intricate web of holding companies, often involving
industrial firms' participation, came into being, as well as banks with wide branch
networks.
It is not clear whether the main bank in the group incorporates all
participants in its statements and, consequently, claim that there's no double
counting if the main bank and its subordinates are presented in thesame sample.
Also, inefficiency of a main bank in this case may be partly due to remaining
banks from the group.
One more interesting detail should be noted here. On the brink of the crisis
of 1998, when banks became aware of the upcoming storm, many of them
See Attachment I for more detailed statistics of the data set.
See Chapter 2 for the detailed discussion on this.73
'bootstrapped' assets by transferring them to a new bank or to another bank from
the same group. For example, SBS-Agro channeled its funds to Zoloto-Platina
bank, one of the group participants. Bank Menatep directed resources to its
St.Petersburg branch, Bank Menatep-St.Petersburg. Considering this, it will not
be surprising to find the former absolutely inefficient and the latter prospering.
Savings bank, the largest Russian bank with 51% of state capital, is not
included in the sample. Most of the deposits of insolvent banks were redirected to
the Savings bank and having it in the sample would make others relatively
inefficient in production approach model and vice versa in intermediation
approach model.
Keeping all these limitations in mind, the challenge is to get the most from
what is available. Ideally, all registered banks need to be included into estimation.
But even thiswillnot guarantee perfect results since model accuracy and
measurement precision is not perfect. At any rate, proceeding with the data in
hand and recognition of its weak points is the usual way many researches follow.
I am taking this path as well.
4.1.2. Descriptive Statistics
Some important summary statistics for the data set are presented in Table
445As we may conclude from taking a brief look at it, GKO balances, together
with total balances dropped down in 1998, regardless of which sample we take.
Statistics for the all variables across all samples are exhibited in the Appendix.74
As for GKO, one of the reasons is that some banks were able to sell them
before the default, when they identified upcoming recession. Furthermore, in the
fall of 1998 CBR allowed banks to reduce the amount of required reserves,
deposited with it, up to 30% in exchange for GKO to make them more liquid
(RECEP).
For the banks with revoked licenses there is, on average, a fall in assets
holdings in practically all categories. It could be explained simply by the fact that
they started to go out of business and their activity stopped. Due to a restructuring
process6they as well could have their assets already partly transferred to another
institution.
Table 4.4. Summary statistics: means for some important variables in adjusted
sample, in mlii R
Bank Status GKO Loan Deposit Equity Total
BalancesBalancesBalances Assets
With 1997 104440 497218 412736 205967 913135
license
in both1998 84491 871988 583712 182297 292344
License1997 75287 381502 314791 85487 634005
revoked
in 19981998 27680 101668 50063 35036 168311
Sample1997 90407 441519 365590 148674 778777
total______
1998 74506 136598 189919 156415 27054475
Another interesting fact is that those banks had equity even in 1997,
practically 2.5 times less, than 'good' banks. Such undercapitalization,
and, distinctively, higher leverage (heavy reliance on borrowed funds) may tell
part of the story why those banks disappeared.
The next chapter is devoted to studying what happened to the efficiency of
Russian banks over the years of 1997 and 1998 using well-grounded tools of DEA
analysis.
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Initial Scores
As an initial step of analysis, efficiency scores for both 1997 and 1998, as
well as MPI were calculated.
We started out by implementing three-output model, where GKO balances
were included in addition to the loan balances and non-interest income. But there
is a potential drawback in this specification. The quality of GKO balances
changed over 1998 drastically: while during 1997 these papers were considered as
the most secure, in 1998 they were the worst part of banks' portfolios. However,
it is difficult to account for this fact in the model. In addition, many banks in our
sample (105 out of 268 in 1997 and 43 out of 164 in 1998) had zero balances on
this item. Therefore, it may pose possible problem of underestimation of their
efficiency.
6 can be several types of events after withdrawal of the license - liquidation,
acquisition, merger, sanitation, according to the CBR law.76
While according to frequency distribution histograms (Figure 4.1. and
Figure 4.2.) the difference between the scores, obtained from two-output and
three-output models is not drastic, we utilized two-output specification to avoid
possible bias, imposed by GKO balances.
Another choice was between input or output orientation models. While
DEA does not require any assumptions about optimizing behavior, we have equal
justification to use either orientation. W specified one of the inputs in the model
- equity - to be quasi-fixed. If we adopt output orientation, the constraints concern
only the outputs, and all inputs are treated in the same fashion, without the
distinction between fixed and not fixed. In this case the model does not account
for the feature we want to incorporate. Input orientation, therefore, seems to be a
better choice and it is used throughout of the study. We also provide some results
for output orientation, as well as score distribution histograms (Figures 4.1.-
44)7
Finally, we acknowledge a possible drawback of using intermediation
approach which assumes treatment of deposits asinputs.During the fmancial
crisis of 1998, a large volume of deposits was withdrawn. This influenced the
input side of the model in the direction of contraction. In this case unstable and
unprudent banks would stay efficient as their input consumption goes down. On
the flip side, banks, which managed to keep their depositors, would look
relatively inefficient.
Theoretically, the results for CRS specification should be the same for both input and
output orientation. The discrepancy in our findings in due to the fact that in input
orientation version equity is quasi-fixed, while in output orientation it is not.77
In such situation, production approach might yield better results. Having
deposits on the output side, decrease in their volume would mean reduction in
efficiency. But in this case some inconsistency arises, since for production
approach we'd better use physical number of accounts of deposits and loans, not
monetary volumes.
To be on the safe side, we apply both intermediation and production
approaches and compare the results.
For results explanation we will use comparative tables, since so-called
two-stage analysis did not yield any significantresults.8
4.2.2. Aggregated Result for 1997 and 1998 Based on Grouping by License
Status, Regional Status and Asset Size
The situation before the crisis is described in the Table 4.5. According to
the input-oriented model of intermediation approach, on average, banking
industry could use only 0.55 1 of all inputs to maintain the level of loans and non-
interest income. (or only 0.609 of all inputs for production approach). 'Good'
banks outperformed bad banks judging by mean overall efficiency mainly due to
higher scale efficiency, but they were very close in pure technical efficiency
merit. This fact suggests that banks which lost their licenses, were less efficient
than those who managed to maintain them throughout 1998. Interestingly,
two-stage analysis efficiency scores are considered as dependent variable which is
being explained by some independent variables with the help of regression analysis.
Though this procedure is very widely used, the fact that efficiency scores are not
independent cautions the reliance on the results of such manipulations.Figure 4.1. Efficiency scores histograms for 1997-1998: intermediation approach, three-output model
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Moscow-based banks were less scale efficient than their regionalpeers.
Since they are bigger in terms of size, decreasing returns to scale probably exist.
If we distinguish banks by assets size, we may notice that the largest banks
have a higher index on average in overall efficiency, which is mostly dueto the
better pure technical performance. But they are less scale efficient than the rest of
the sample on average. The suggestion that lower scale efficiency indicates
decreasing returns to scale fits the picture of banks performance very nicely.
Banks with higher scale efficiency index are 'good', non-Moscow and small in
terms of assets. According to the CBR (1999), banks with these characteristics
were better performers in both 1997 and 1998.
These results also hold for production model. (See Table 4.7). The only
difference is for big and small banks: smaller banks are more efficient according
to this model.
As for 1998 (see Table 4.6.), things are quite different. Actually,average
efficiency score is higher in 1998 than in 1997 for all specifications- input and
output orientation or intermediation-production. And as we analyze 'good' and
'bad' peers'°, 'good' ones perform significantly better in terms of overall and scale
efficiency, while pure technical efficiency merits are still very close in
intermediation model.
be more precise, we cannot compare these averages across the years, since the
efficiency scores were calculated using different frontiers.
'° defmition of 'good' and 'bad' is given in the Section 3.4.Figure 4.3. Efficiency histograms for 1998, intermediation approach
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Figure 4.4. Malmquist productivity index histogram. intermediation approach,
input orientation
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21 20Table 4.5.Efficiency measures in 1997: input-oriented model vs output-oriented model.
Input-oriented model Output-oriented model
Bank
category
Groups overall
efficiency
pure
technical
efficiency
scale
efficiency
overall
efficiency
pure
technical
efficiency
scale
efficiency
Total sample 0.551 0.854 0.645 0.609 0.889 0.685
License in'Good' 0.673 0.856 0.787 0.694 0.884 0.784
1998 'Bad' 0.404 0.852 0.475 0.498 0.897 0.554
Region
Moscow 0.570 0.893 0.638 0.630 0.920 0.684
non-Moscow 0.429 0.612 0.701 0.475 0.691 0.687
Total assets
272- 13041
13583-51658
0.577 0.628 0.9 19 0.628 0.664 0.946
0.464 0.501 0.927 0.521 0.574 0.908
range in
thousand R51990-230905
233589-29065458
0.429 0.482 0.890 0.486 0.565 0.861
0.650 0.878 0.740 0.675 0.909 0.742
00Table 4.6.Efficiency measures in 1998: input-oriented model vs output-oriented model.
Input-oriented model Output-oriented model
Bank
category
Groups overall
efficiency
pure
technical
efficiency
scale
efficiency
overall
efficiency
pure
technical
efficiency
scale
efficiency
Total sample 0.702 0.876 0.802 0.734 0.903 0.8 14
License in'Good' 0.777 0.886 0.877 0.8 13 0.912 0.891
1998 'Bad' 0.309 0.802 0.385 0.320 0.827 0.387
Region
Moscow 0.733 0.889 0.825 0.766 0.913 0.839
non-Moscow 0.273 0.640 0.426 0.288 0.697 0.414
Total assets
0.8-403.8 0.24 1 0.332 0.728 0.254 0.425 0.598
407.7-3409.2 0.3 19 0.579 0.55 1 0.33 1 0.589 0.562
range in
thousand R3566.5-22063.4 0.296 0.46 1 0.643 0.355 0.584 0.608
22410.0-25941110.3 0.709 0.882 0.804 0.740 0.907 0.816
0085
For grouping by assets banks with the biggest assets values 22410-
25941110 thousand R - are distinctively different and have the highest average
efficiency score.
The evidence that bigger banks and banks based in Moscow are better
performers in 1998 is not very appealing. The result we obtained diverges from
what might be expected for the following reason. In fact, our sample does contain
proportions of Moscow and non-Moscow banks approximately close to the
population ones. But for 1998, most of the 'bad' banks were non-Moscow based,
and Moscow part of the sample contained more 'good' banks. Consequently,
Moscow banks perform better, though this is not what we expect.
The outcome of the production model is the same for all categories.
If we compare respective frequency distribution histograms (Figure 4.2.
for 1997 and Figure 4.3. for 1998), we may notice that the shapes of distribution
for intermediation approach changed and become more even in 1998, but like in
1997 a larger portion of banks was in the last bin with the best scores." This does
not necessarily indicate excellent performance. Since we measure relative
performance, we may conclude that banks in our sample are just quite similar to
each other.
The number of efficient banks - banks composing the frontier - fell from
1997 to 1998. We conclude that it was more difficult to maintain good
performance when the crisis hit. Therefore, only a few banks were able to do so.
Weighting the scores by the assets size for finding average scores helped to avoid
giving small banks large influence on the whole picture. Evidence from histograms
would suggest higher average efficiency scores.Table 4.7.Efficiency measures in 1997: intermediation approach vs production approach
Bank
category.
Groups
Intermediation approach Production approach
overall
efficiency
pure
technical
efficiency
scale
efficiency
overall
efficiency
pure
technical
efficiency
scale
efficiency
Total sample 0.55 1 0.854 0.645 0.584 0.878 0.678
License in
1998
'Good' 0.673 0.856 0.787 0.700 0.888 0.789
'Bad' 0.404 0.852 0.475 0.404 0.861 0.505
Region
Moscow 0.570 0.893 0.638 0.603 0.909 0.670
non-Moscow 0.429 0.612 0.701 0.443 0.644 0.739
Total
assets
range in
thousand R
272- 13041 0.577 0.628 0.919 0.616 0.655 0.920
13583-51658 0.464 0.501 0.927 0.469 0.510 0.948
51990-230905 0.429 0.482 0.890 0.452 0.503 0.9 19
233589-29065458 0.650 0.878 0.740 0.590 0.896 0.665
00Table 4.8.Efficiency measures in 1998: intermediation approach vs production approach
Intermediation approach Production approach
Bank
categor'y
Groups overall
efficiency
pure
technical
efficiency
scale
efficiency
overall
efficiency
pure
technical
efficiency
scale
efficiency
Total sample 0.702 0.876 0.802 0.759 0.80 1 0.920
License in'Good' 0.777 0.886 0.877 0.828 0.868 0.932
1998 'Bad' 0.309 0.802 0.385 0.200 0.255 0.827
RegionMoscow 0.733 0.889 0.825 0.781 0.819 0.932
non-Moscow 0.273 0.640 0.426 0.279 0.415 0.658
Total assets
0.8-403.8 0.241 0.332 0.728 0.267 0.311 0.844
407.7-3409.2 0.3 19 0.579 0.551 0.287 0.459 0.705 range in
thousand R
3566.5-22063.4 0.296 0.461 0.643 0.348 0.459 0.768
22410.0- 25941110.3 0.709 0.882 0.804 0.764 0.805 0.922
0088
4.2.3. Testing Group Differences
Table 4.9. Tests concerning license status, group status and regional status and
efficiency: intermediation model with two outputs
Bank Type of Test of Kruskal- Van der Savage
Categorymeasure median
(Prob>x2)
Wallis test
(Prob>x2)
Waerden
test
test
(Prob>x2)
rob>x2)
"Good"Overall 0.1340 0.0388 0.0381 2.1086
and Efficiency (0.7143) (0.8438) (0.8453)(0.1465)
"bad" for 1997
Overall 0.0283 0.0303 0.0001 1.2105
Efficiency (0.8665) (0.8606) (0.996 1)(0.27 12)
for 1998
MPI1 0.6725 0.0364 0.2842 0.0422
(0.4122) (0.8486) (0.5939)(0.8372)
MoscowOverall 1.6057 1.0032 0.8062 4.0895
and non-Efficiency (0.2051) (0.3165) (0.3692)(0.043 1)
Moscowfor 1997
Overall 3.1885 5.3009 5.9004 5.2346
Efficiency (0.0742) (0.0213) (0.0151)(0.0221)
for 1998
MPI1 0.5043 0.1914 0.2955 0.1398
(0.4776) (0.6617) (0.5867)(0.7084)
Size byOverall 10.5791 5.0730 4.7767 4.1938
assets Efficiency (0.1427) (0.1665) (0.1889)(0.2413)
for 1997
Overall 8.2675 11.8051 10.342222.7398
Efficiency (0.0408) (0.0081) (0.0159)(0.0001)
for 1998
MPI1 8.4443 12.9250 12.6163 7.5447
(0.0377) (0.0048) (0.0055)(0.0534)
To see whether our separation into groups is statistically significant, a
number of non-parametric tests wereperformed.'2Their results are presented in
12The test procedures and underlying intuition are discussed in Grosskopf (1996) and
SAS manual (1996). Application of this technique can be found in Fukuyama (1993) and
Worthington (1999). We implemented this test for intermediation model only.89
the Table 4.9. As we can conclude, none of the 1997scores differ significantly
across the categories. But for 1998, tests were able to detect that there was a
difference between Moscow and non-Moscow banks, as well asamong asset size
category. MPI was detected to differ significantly only for this group as well.
4.2.5. Productivity Change
For productivity growth analysis we may start from frequency distribution
histograms for intermediation model (Figure 4.4), which reveal that most of the
banks were experiencing falling productivity, mostly due to technological regress.
Tables 4.10 and 4.11. also support this fact. Surprisingly, group differentialsare
not big. Distinctively, the group of smallest banks was the only one where
productivity growth occurred for intermediation approach. In application of
production approach, no group showed productivity growth on average.
Technological regress was detected by both intermediation and production
models. For big banks it was more serious. For example, very powerful computer
networks connecting branches of bigger banks have fallen apart, as the main
offices experience difficulties. Also, a managerial expertise declines when
qualified banking personnel is left with no jobs. On the whole, financial crisis
caused a disorganization in Russianbanking.'3
Blanchard (1997) casts the general notion of disorganization in a formal model
featuring the break down of input and output relationship following the collapse of
central planning to explain the recession that occurred throughout the former Soviet
Union and Central Europe in the early years of transition. The financial crisis of 1998
imposed a shock on Russian banks that depressed output in a similar way.Table 4.10.Malmquist productivity index 1997-1998 and its decomposition: intermediation approach vs production approach
Bank
category Groups
Intermediation approach Production approach
Efficiency
Change
Tech.
Change
MPI
Efficiency
Change
Tech.
Change
Total sample 0.743 1.658 0.448 0.649 1.402 0.462
License in
1998
'Good' 0.725 1.624 0.447 0.646 1.364 0.474
'Bad' 0.866 1.885 0.460 0.663 1.665 0.398
Region
Moscow 0.718 1.889 0.407 0.645 1.355 0.476
non-Moscow 0.768 1.445 0.497 0.663 1.452 0.457
Total assets
range in
thousand R
0.8-403.8 1.133 2.026 0.559 0.855 1.854 0.591
407.7-3409.2 0.742 1.777 0.4 17 0.653 1.452 0.450
3566.5-22410.0 0.580 1.384 0.4 19 0.472 0.984 0.480
23050.1-25941110.3 0.627 1.517 0.413 0.666 1.447
_______
0.359Table 4.11.Some quantitave results for Malmquist productivity index 1997-1998 :intermediation approach
vs production approach
Bank
category Groups
Intermediation_approach Production_approach
MN> 1 (%
of group
total)
MPI<1(%
of group
total)
MPI
MPI> 1 (%
of group
total)
MPI<1(%
of group
total)
MPI
Total sample 41% 59% 0.743 32% 68% 0.649
License in
1998
'Good' 44% 56% 0.725 31% 69% 0.646
'Bad' 40% 60% 0.866 43% 57% 0.663
Region
Moscow 39% 61% 0.718 31% 69% 0.645
non-Moscow 43% 57% 0.768 34% 66% 0.663
Total assets
range in
thousandR
0.8-403.8 58% 42% 1.133 55% 45% 0.855
407.7-3409.2 32% 68% 0.742 24% 76% 0.653
3566.5-22410.0 34% 66% 0.580 24% 76% 0.472
23050.1-25941110.3 39% 61% 0.627 37% 66%
______
0.666
'092
Among Moscow banks technological regress was deeper than among those from
other regions according to both intermediation and production models. The
population of Moscow banks consists of bigger banks, andmany of them were
involved with forward contracts and GKO trading accounts. Theseareas of
activity, crucial for them, were closed for operations since August 1998 for the
rest of the year. This fact accounts for backward shift of Moscow banks.
An interesting issue isefficiency growth,which we notice in 73% of
banks. For intermediation approach explanation we may use the following logic.
As banks get into trouble, they usually can not get rid of their illiquid assets and,
therefore, loan balances, are still high. Besides, deposits were taken from them.
Other inputs (mostly salary and current expenses) were reduced.
All this contributed to the increase in efficiency. This may be a plausible
argument for explanation why 'bad' banks bad lower level of productivity decline
- their efficiency change was positive and higher than that of 'good' banks ( See
Table 4.10.). This result also holds for production approach.
On the whole, technological regress is not very easy to explain intuitively.
But in our case, the evidence for this seems to be the infrastructure breakdown:
some operations were not performed on the market any longer, payments were
difficult to get through, networks of regional branches of big banks were falling
apart. In addition, people's trust into credit institutions was undermined.
There are some differences between intermediation and production model
results, which we need to mention. Compared at means, efficiency change for
Moscow and non-Moscow banks from intermediation model is in favor of93
Moscow banks. The opposite result is obtained from production model. For
technological change, the results move in the opposite directions for thiscategory
and 'good'-'bad' banks. This is explained by the fact that having deposits in the
output side does make a difference for the efficiency scores distribution.
To conclude, at the end of 1998, the performance of Russian bankswas
worse than before the crisis - this is not a sensation. The adverse effect of the
financial breakdown was more severe for bigger banks, because theywere deeply
involved with GKO trading and forward contracts market, which werevery
vulnerable to the budget deficit sustainability. On the other hand, the reckless
actions of the banks also contributed to the financial crisis and reinforced the fact
that regulation in Russian banking system should be more rigorous. The fact that
regional and smaller banks were less susceptible to the crisis only shows that
these banks were less developed and did not participate in the riskier andmore
lucrative markets, as Alexandr Turbanov, of ARCO explained (Expert, June
1999). Judging by the license status, we also notice that 'bad' banks had deeper
technological regress, even though their efficiency change was better. This is
mainly due to the decrease in input consumption.CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS
5.1. Summary of the Study
In this study the efficiency of Russian banks during the fmancial crisisof
1998 was evaluated. Our analysis focused on the relative evaluation of
performance of banks before and after the crisis. Wecompare efficiency and
productivity growth differentials in order to understand what categories of banks
were better performers.
As a method of study we used Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA
models have been extensively used for analyzing banking firms. Their advantage
is the ability to incorporate multiple inputs and multiple outputsas well as various
fonns of constraints. It is also consistent with axiomatic production theory. The
limitation of this approach is relativity of the efficiency indexes- they show how
the firms fare compared to the best practice peers.
For intermediation model, we used a two-output model, where loan
balances and non-interest income composed the output vector. Tosee whether the
results of intermediation approach differ from the results of production approach,
we applied both specifications. For production approach deposits were treated as
outputs.
We attempted to explain differential efficiency and productivity change in
terms of three factors: license status, region, and size (using total assets).
By applying intermediation model, we found that in 1997 relative scale
efficiency of banks scored better if they were smaller in terms of size, maintainedtheir licenses since August 1998 during the rest of theyear and did not belong to
the Moscow region. Overall efficiency was higher for banks with licensesuntil
the end of 1998, from Moscow region and big in terms of assets. Forproduction
approach, the results are the same with the only difference in that biggerbanks
were more overall efficient than smaller ones.
The results for 1998 evaluation are mixed. 'Good' banks again scored
better. Surprisingly enough, Moscow banks and banks with the highestassets
were better in the respective subgroups. We would expect that Moscow banks be
less successful, since the crisis hurt them the most. The explanation for thatwas
found in the imperfections of the data set: we had more Moscow banks, which
were 'good' and, therefore, suffered less. These results are again the same
regardless of the approach chosen- either intermediation or production.
In order to determine whether the banks in the different subgroups differ
significantly, we implemented a number of non-parametric tests. Significant
differences were found by assets size and Moscow vs. non-Moscow.'
According to the intermediation model, productivity growth occurred for
41% of the banks in the sample while 59% experienced a productivity decline.
But on average, only the group of smallest banks has MPI >1 (improvements).
Decomposition of MPI revealed, that the main source of decline is negative
technological change, reflected in average indices for all groups. For production
model, no group showed technological progress. Both models detected significant
fall back in technology and positive efficiency change.
'We did this test for intermediation approach only.Positive efficiency change is an interesting phenomenon fora banking
sector in recession. Many inputs are reduced by firms during the hard times (ina
way, crisis makes banks more efficient, make them squeeze their resource usage).
In addition, one of the most important inputs- deposits - was substantially
decreased due to the runs on the banks. On the other hand, loans are hard to recall,
and their balances did not change drastically. In this case positive efficiency
change is achieved through the reduction of inputs. Even when we applied the
production model and moved deposits into the output side, we observed positive
efficiency change.
But the results were quite different for groups. Compared at means,
efficiency change for Moscow and non-Moscow banks from intermediation
model is in favor of Moscow banks. The opposite result is obtained from
production model. For technological change, the results move in the opposite
direction for this category and for 'good' and 'bad' banks. This is explained by the
fact that having deposits on the output side does make a difference for efficiency
scores distribution.
For productivity change, we found that banks scored better if theywere
smaller in terms of size, did not lose their licenses since August 1998 during the
rest of the year and did not belong to Moscow region. This result is supported by
the fact that those banks were as well more profitable and have fewer incidences
of failure, as reported by CBR (1999). Interestingly, underdevelopment of this
group of banks (they did not have access to the riskier and more lucrative
markets, did not have appropriate professionals) helped them to survive.97
5.2. Limitations of the Study and Directions for Future Research
This study is one of the first attempts to put together quantitative research
on Russian banks performance. It contains a number of weaknesses, which can be
addressed in future research. We did not deal with the issue how efficient Russian
banking sector was in terms of its size, scope of offered services, allocation of
credit. We studied how banks fared relative to each other.
First, we would use a larger sample and a more representative one. It
seems to be easier to get more observations as times goes by. The CBR constantly
tries to improve the transparency of the banking system. The number of banks
with information posted on the CBR's website grows constantly. So, the chances
to collect more information improve.
Second, we would want to account for assets quality as well. CBR has
issued several recommendations on how to weight the assets with respect to their
riskiness. But the ones available at the moment of writing would place GKOs in
the group of the best assets in terms of quality. This is not a satisfactory
correction since the quality of this particular type of assets deteriorated drastically
over 1998. Another way to account for the 'bad' assets could be inclusion of the
proportion of 'bad' loans (Resti, 1997). But this information was not available for
each observation.
Third, we only incorporated in explanation of efficiency differentials three
factors - license status, regional allocation and size. It is obvious that additional
factors could be researched. These could include ownership structure, origin, age,
belonging to FIG, etc.98
Fourth, we used simple technical efficiency model specification, since the
information on the prices was not available. Application ofa more advanced
model, such as profit efficiency estimation, would bemore informative. We also
evaluated the results at means. Comparisons of density distributions could yield
some more insights on what was happening.
Fifth, results of such a study could be used as additional surveillance tool
by policy makers, CBR in particular (Barr and Siems, 1998). But again, for
transition economy there should be a special approach. As Gorton and Winton
(1998) indicate, if the banks fail the so called 'social charter value' is lost and it is
not always the best choice for social welfare maximization. Another issue is
moral hazard problem - banks, which are 'too big to fail', may consciously be
involved in the riskier activities, accounting for the possible bailing out.
Sixth, for policy implications, the model with resource reallocation within
the banking sector may be particularly instructive. (See Fare, Grosskopf and Li,
1992). Since ARCO (Agency for Restructuring of Credit Organizations) has only
a limited amount of resources, which need to be distributed within the industry
and can be reallocated.
This study may be considered as a stepping stone for further research of
the banking sector in transition economies in general and in Russia in particular.BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Stdev 3221562.681642658.74415770.4515575.6725722.7833190.701930773.682040530.70 945159.942124952.093780364.43
median 30217.92 6736.31 3241.391181.142005.091575.51 33634.59 7683.10 22985.13 4127.93 54780.13
mm 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.48 6.26 0.00 1.56 0.00-10306448.36 0.00 19.56
max 29456939.7515726010.954120142.41127383.41149468.70218850.5516841195.6220077656.493282312.9925941110.3336918852.11
number of bares in subsample j14
adjusted average 736598.34317656.4974506.255514.8310088.6610295.10489919.20375057.39 156414.93270544.31864976.58
stdev 3300023.211686023.91425959.9215604.7524449.6531588.941976509.121865274.45 522254.392128863.663747960.62
median 29330.20 7215.96 3259.781225.352294.21 1611.89 33237.87 7528.95 25429.58 3371.67 48371.67
mm o.00 0.00 0.00 5.48 6.26 0.00 1.56 0.00 516.43 0.00 19.56
max 29456939.7515726010.954120142.41127383.41149468.70218850.5516841195.6220077656.493282312.9925941110.3336918852.11
number of banksin subsample jfi